A Feminist Looks at Ronald Dworkin's Theory of Equality
AbstractThis piece is a 'work in progress' dealing Dworkin's theory of equality and its related social vision from a feminist perspective. Criticisms of method and substance are put forward. Methodologically, there is too much emphasis upon abstract principles. Also, issues of sex appear to intrude into Dworkin's notionally objective stance (the 'independence' principle). The implications of this depends upon what social/familial structures are carried over from current society. Linguistic analysis, although not decisive, supports the view that structures oppressive to women are envisaged. A notable substantive problem is the theory's reliance on a questionable public/private distinction. Also, the emphasis given to and the role placed upon private resources and related phenomena seem to run counter to feminist concerns, and in places goes unjustified. The definition of equality fails to address the reality of the oppression of women in the real world. The author criticises the central freedom/equality dichotomy. There seems an unstated assumption of the continuance of modes of oppression of women, especially in the private sphere. The issue of insurance for child bearing is a key example. Reservations are expressed regarding the theory of political power and political equality. |