E LAW - MURDOCH UNIVERSITY ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF LAW VOLUME 1 NUMBER 4 (DECEMBER 1994) Copyright E Law and/or authors Review of Western Australian State Taxes 1994 Chapter 6 A BROAD-BASED STATE SERVICES TAX Part 1 Introduction Why Not A Goods and Services Tax? Part 2 Equity Equity - The Existing Taxes Vertical Equity Horizontal Equity Tobacco Alcohol Petrol Services Tax Summary Part 3 Efficiency The economic rationale behind a services tax The efficiency criterion The effect on service providers The effect on service recipients Summary Part 4 Simplicity The Structure Of The Tax Multiple Rates or a Single Rate? Exemptions and Zero-Ratings Methods Of Enforcement Tax Evasion and Non-Registration General Problem of Tax Evasion in Underreported Sales Summary Part 5 Conclusion Bibliography PART 1 INTRODUCTION This chapter discusses the possibility of introducing a broad-based services tax in Western Australia. The State may choose to introduce such a tax for a number of reasons, such as, so that it can replace an existing tax or decrease its reliance on Commonwealth grants. The latter course of action would be fraught with political and economic difficulties and is beyond the scope of this chapter. There are already a number of collections by the State which are or resemble services taxes. They are: (i) Financial Institutions Duty (F.I.D.); (ii) Debits Tax; (iii) Tobacco Franchise Fees; (iv) Alcohol Franchise Fees; (v) Petrol Franchise Fees; and (vi) Fees for Public Utilities and Services. The Franchise Fees rest precariously in this group in that their existence is largely due to the High Court s reluctance to overrule past decisions relating to section 90 of the Commonwealth Constitution.[1] However, it is possible to construe them as services taxes if they are seen as applying to the service of providing tobacco, alcohol and petrol products. The 1993 Review of Western Australian State Taxes[2] discussed the first five of these service taxes in terms of the criteria for optimal taxes and found them to be relatively simple taxes, with equity problems. While attempts to make F.I.D. and Debits Tax more equitable have not severely damaged the simplicity of those taxes, they have failed to adequately address their inherent equity problems.[3] The Franchise taxes are good revenue raisers because the subjects of the tax exhibit a low price elasticity[4] but they also have equity problems resulting from this same feature.[5] Franchise fees are also quite simple to collect and the inelasticity of their subject matter tends to prevent any adverse reaction in terms of the efficiency of resource allocation in the market.The last category of existing services taxes, fees for Public Utilities including water and electricity, was not examined last year and the discussion below will focus only on equity. Why Not A Goods and Services Tax? The majority of critics advocating change recognise that a services tax is best complemented by a goods tax but they also recognise the problems this entails in the Australian federal system. Section 90 of the Commonwealth Constitution prevents the States levying duties of excise .[6] This section has been held to prevent the States from levying taxes on the manufacture or distribution of goods.The definition of excise presently favoured by the High Court is very broad with the courts looking beyond the form of the legislation to its substance.[7] Tobacco, alcohol and petrol taxes have been spared because of political and economic factors, in particular the fact that the States have organised their affairs in reliance on the validity of earlier decisions.[8] However, the High Court has been reticent to allow the States to levy taxes on goods beyond this limited group of products.[9]Therefore, the first hurdle for any tax on services is its constitutional boundary. There are substantial difficulties in distinguishing services from goods . For example, a lawyer clearly provides a service, a mechanic will provide both parts and services which can be easily distinguished, but does a coffee shop provide a service or does it manufacture a finished product? It is arguable that the finished product is the roast coffee bean and the making of the cappuccino from it is a service. However, the argument that the finished product is the cappuccino appears equally valid and, if so, a tax on the coffee shop providing the coffee to the customer contravenes section 90. Any attempt to formally distinguish the manufacture of the finished product from the services provided by the coffee shop would entail difficulties which would severely compromise the simplicity of the tax. Other problems exist beyond the constitutional minefield. The following sections of this chapter will examine these in the light of overseas experience. The discussion will take place under the umbrella of equity, efficiency and simplicity. PART 2 EQUITY Overseas services taxes have experienced problems with equity and this is reflected in the complex nature of those taxes.[10] This section of the chapter will examine current services taxes with regard to equity and consider the implications for a broad-based services tax. Equity - The Existing Taxes Financial institutions duty and debits tax have received analysis elsewhere in this publication[11] and the issues will not be re-canvassed here. It will be sufficient to endorse the proposal of substituting a composite Financial Transactions Tax with its concomitant improvement in equity. Vertical Equity The general theory is that taxes which are not proportionally linked to the ability of the payer to pay are vertically inequitable.[12] Therefore, a broad-based services tax will only achieve vertical equity where, assuming the tax is passed on to the consumer, the consumption of a service is proportional to the economic capacity of the individual. Although this will vary depending on the service, the likelihood of the tax being vertically inequitable is high. The fact that Business Franchise Fees are fundamentally excises masquerading as service taxes does not alter this conclusion: the amount of tax paid is proportional to consumption.[13] Service taxes are the functional economic equivalent of excises and vertical inequity cannot be addressed by altering the tax rate according to consumption in the same way that income tax rates are increased. Horizontal Equity The high rates of tax imposed on tobacco, alcohol and petrol necessitate a consideration of the incidence of the tax in more detail. Given that tobacco and alcohol are both inelastic consumer goods, the incidence of the tax falls primarily upon the purchaser. Petrol, on the other hand, is commonly consumed in the course of commerce with the result that the incidence of the tax is far broader. A tax on fuel sold for non-productive consumer use is borne by the consumer and is widely spread throughout the community. This wide incidence of the petrol tax makes it horizontally equitable. Tobacco and alcohol taxes, in contrast, are only horizontally equitable within the particular consumption sector.[14] Tobacco High taxation rates on tobacco are often supported by the claim that tobacco consumption imposes economic costs for health care which the general community should not bear. This argument has force because the consumption of tobacco is statistically related to resultant health costs. A group of smokers will incur health costs proportional to consumption.[15] A tax rate which produces aggregate revenue below that total cost results in horizontal inequity in favour of the smokers. Similarly, a tax rate which produces aggregate revenue that is higher than the predicted health costs results in a similar inequity in favour of non-smokers. Alcohol These arguments do not apply to alcohol. The community costs of alcohol consumption result from the behavioural decisions of those who consume it. It is not equitable to impose costs on consumers who do not drive after drinking, or those who beat their spouses, merely because there are other individuals who do. The salient difference between tobacco and alcohol is that community costs associated with tobacco consumption by any individual are statistically predictable, whereas this cannot be said in relation to alcohol.[16] Petrol The arguments relating to the equity of fuel tax are different again. Tax paid on fuel in the course of commerce is likely to be diffused throughout the community by increased costs of goods and services. While transport costs affect the price of some goods and services more than others, the disparity will be minimal and a reasonable degree of horizontal equity exists. Services Tax It is difficult to assess the equity of a broad-based services tax without a working model. Due to constitutional and equitable problems,[17] it is suggested that a practical way to impose a broad-based services tax would be to list the services to be taxed. Law, architecture, medicine and accountancy would be good candidates, as machinery currently exists to regulate these professions. The existence of practicing certificates or licences provides easy identification of potential taxation points and it would simply be a matter of establishing the value of the services provided. Political opposition to a services tax with respect to medicine would probably be insurmountable because it would be seen as a tax on the sick. Similarly, a tax on legal services could further reduce their already limited availability to middle and lower- income Australians when the services are not covered by Legal Aid. This might be averted by applying a sufficient tax threshold, subject to concerns in relation to simplicity. This is not to say that a broad-based services tax has no future, but a limited list of services to be taxed may be the best option. Those services which can be identified as substantially supplied for commercial purposes would be able to bear a higher rate consistent with considerations of equity. However, the tax rate which could be set would be limited by the possibility of services being provided interstate.[18]There is also the issue of whether or not a distinction should be made between public and private institutions in the application of a services tax. If public services are excluded, private services could legitimately claim inter-sector inequity. On the other hand, inclusion of government services may be inappropriate since government services are often provided for welfare purposes or because of their beneficial externalities. Summary While it is true that a services tax lends itself to the liberal equitable footprint ,[19] it does not necessarily meet the standard model of equity. The discussion on franchise fees concluded that the broadest tax, the tax on petrol, was more equitable than the narrower tobacco tax. It may be anticipated, therefore, that a sufficiently broad services tax might be better than a tax with a narrow base. PART 3 EFFICIENCY The economic rationale behind a services tax The tax system is an instrument of social reform and economic intervention.[20] As an instrument of economic intervention, it can be used to discriminate arbitrarily in favour of certain economic activities and organisations perceived to be desirable by legislators to the detriment of others perceived as undesirable.[21] Thus, a tax may operate to discourage the activity on which it has been imposed. This consequence, however, may not always be the intention of the legislators. Taxes which are intended to generate revenue, as opposed to ones designed to regulate certain activities, may have unforseen or unintended effects on the marketplace. Taxes which typically fall into this category are those with narrow revenue bases and high rates.[22] Inequitable and inefficient taxes such as stamp duties,[23] with their multiple rates and large number of exemptions, become arbitrary in their impact and complex to administer.[24] In addition, the narrowness of their revenue base and wide range of tax rates affect relative prices, thereby distorting consumption decisions.[25] Therefore, it follows that broad-based taxes with flat rates and few exemptions have less distortional effects on the marketplace. With this idea in mind, a services tax with a flat rate and few exemptions could be considered as a substitute for stamp duties. The efficiency criterion Efficiency analysis, from a taxation policy perspective, is based on the economic assumption that the interaction of unrestricted market forces always results in the optimal allocation of resources.[26] Flowing from this assumption, an ideal tax should be neutral with respect to the economic behaviour of producers and consumers. Taxes should not unintentionally distort the behaviour of these parties. In relation to a services tax, the relevant parties are the service provider (producer) and the service recipient (consumer).An efficient tax is one that does not induce service providers to change the forms and methods by which they provide the service, nor does it induce the service recipients to change the services they use. The effect on service providers The service provider is likely to be the person who would be liable to collect and pay the tax to the State Taxation Office. However, the ultimate incidence of the tax is unlikely to be borne by the service provider due to the reason that a tax which increases the cost of supplying a service is likely to be passed on to the service recipient. This one-off price increase in the cost of services to accommodate the tax is unlikely to have a continual effect on inflation. For political, economic, moral or equity reasons, the tax is likely to be implemented with exemptions. Essential services associated with education, health and social welfare will undoubtedly fall within this category. Financial services are also likely to be exempt[27] (a tax levied at a rate of 15% on financial services will very quickly terminate the State s economy). Although justifiable, exemptions may create problems associated with the categorisation of services. This type of problem has been a feature of many stamp duty disputes where liability is dependent on the way in which the transaction is categorised.[28] The existence of exempt categories may encourage service providers to characterise their services, where possible, as one that falls within those categories. The effect on service recipients An obvious method to avoid a services tax is to minimise the use of taxable services. A more serious problem arises when service consumers seek to avoid the tax by using equivalent services offered interstate or overseas where it is possible and practical to do so. However, this problem is addressed in jurisdictions where a services tax is in operation[29] by provisions which typically read as follows:If the supplier is not resident in the State, the service is deemed to be supplied in the State if either:(i) the service is received in the State; or(ii) the service is performed in the State.However, such provisions may in practice prove difficult to enforce as the flow of interstate services needs to be continuously monitored.[30] Tax liability also depends on the circumstances under which services are rendered. For example, health services rendered by a public medical facility may be zero-rated (hence escaping the tax) while the same service rendered by a private medical facility may be liable. Under these circumstances, the differential treatment of health services may result in an undesirable distortion of the health care market. Service consumers with private health insurance may place excessive demands on the public health care system. Although differential treatment of services may be desirable for equity reasons, its potential distortional effects need to be anticipated and taken into account. Summary A broad-based services tax will not necessarily be efficient unless it is complemented by a strictly flat rate and minimal exemptions. Differential rates and exemptions are major causes of efficiency problems. The introduction of the tax by a single State can also lead to distortions due to service shopping which is difficult to police. However, if introduced in the manner described, it is likely to be easy to administer and provide a broad platform for raising State revenue. PART 4 SIMPLICITY In terms of simplicity, a services tax appears undesirable. Several overseas jurisdictions have introduced a services tax as part of their Value Added Tax (aka Goods and Services Tax) regime but have experienced substantial difficulties in this area, especially in relation to administration and collection. The simplicity of a tax is largely dependent upon costs of administration. The simpler a tax is, the lower this will be. However, there are several factors which work to increase costs and, therefore, erode the simplicity of the tax. These factors are grouped into two broad areas; i) the structure of the tax, and ii) methods of control and enforcement. The Structure Of The Tax The most important factors are the number of rates to be imposed and the question of exemptions. Multiple Rates or a Single Rate? Multiple rates are one method of addressing equity problems but this will affect the simplicity of the tax. Tax administrators prefer a single rate, whereas politicians perceive electoral advantage in imposing lower rates of tax on services which are considered to be used most frequently by lower income earners.[31] However, although such intentions may arise from a genuine concern for people s welfare, as well as being politically advantageous, they inevitably increase the complexity of the tax, while not necessarily achieving the purposes for which they were intended. Multiple tax rates will result in tax forms becoming more complex.[32] Therefore, there will be a corresponding increase in the possibility of error (both by taxpayers and administrators), as well as tax evasion. Even if there are lower rates for those services which are considered to be the province of lower income earners, these individuals will not necessarily receive the benefit intended by the lower rate: the wealthy often use services generally associated with lower income earners. Conversely, services normally associated with wealth, such as electricity and telecommunications, are not used exclusively by the wealthy. Thus, a single rate is preferable in terms of simplicity. Exemptions and Zero-Ratings These raise further complications. Ideally, for a tax to be simple, there would be no exemptions at all, however, there are many practical difficulties with this. There are three main reasons for exemptions and zero-rating. The first is identical to the policy behind multiple tax rates, and is fraught with the same problems. The second relates to merit services such as health care and education which many consider should not be taxed.[33] This is particularly so on the grounds of equity, especially if one believes that everyone has a right to these services so that they should be subsidised if not free.[34]The final reason for creating exemptions is that some services, such as financial services, are simply too difficult to tax.[35] Taxation of these services would be impracticable as the taxes would cost more to collect than they would to impose.The situations highlighted above demonstrate the need for exemptions despite the effect they have simplicity.The New Zealand Goods and Services Tax introduced in 1986 demonstrates many of the problems of this tax.[36] Initially it was introduced as a single rate of tax, the only exemption being in relation to exports. However, the Government was forced to grant exemptions in areas where tax collection was becoming too difficult, including financial services, life insurance, some residential accommodation payments and central and local government services. Although a no-exemption tax model is ideal, obtaining the broadest base possible and maintaining simplicity requires accommodation in certain areas. Methods Of Enforcement In Canada all businesses must register unless they are earning below a specified amount.[37] Those not required to register pay no tax under the exemption for small traders.[38] This can have two possible effects: the tax may become easier to collect, or it may become more difficult to collect. Granting exemptions to small businesses with a low turnover may keep the tax simple[39] because there will be fewer collection points. However, this may make only a marginal difference, depending on the level of commercial development in the jurisdiction in which the tax is introduced. It may have a smaller impact on developing countries, in which fewer people use services such as hairdressers and restaurants, than in developed countries such as the United States or Britain. Imposing a threshold is more likely to increase the complexity of the tax. Tax Evasion and Non-Registration The registration threshold may encourage tax evasion. For example, a large business may be divided into two or more smaller businesses, each with a turnover below the threshold, in an attempt to avoid tax.[40] This would necessitate more money for monitoring and safeguards. However, this may be easily avoided by providing that the liability for tax will be measured on the aggregate sales of all the separate branches. Non-registration is a definite concern, and should be viewed as a serious offence, attracting a suitably heavy penalty. However, this again results in increased administrative costs. General problem of tax evasion in underreported sales The underreporting of sales is the major problem which has arisen in jurisdictions which already have a services tax and is the most usual way to evade the tax. In Europe tax administrators have discovered that it is especially common in small trades such as carpentry and plumbing.[41] Constant checks can be run, but this may involve substantial administrative costs, and it may be more expensive to collect the tax than to impose it. Other jurisdictions have attempted to surmount this difficulty by requiring traders to use numbered receipts stating their name, address and registration number.[42] However, this practice has not been successful. Traders can fill out reduced amounts on their receipts (although customers may still be required to pay the full price) or else receipts may not be filled out at all.[43] Monitoring this kind of activity again necessitates considerable financial outlay, which diminishes the simplicity of the tax. Summary If a government had sufficient political will it could implement a services tax which, in terms of simplicity, would outperform taxes such as stamp duty. The fact that stamp duty consists of so many taxes, is perforated by so many exemptions and is punctured by variance in rates, creates a very complicated structure for the tax. The rationale behind the varying rates is confusing and could be causing distortion in the market and complicating otherwise routine transactions.[44]A broad-based services tax could also make inroads into areas which are generally cash areas such as hair dressers, prostitution and other personal services and thus avoid close scrutiny. This is a common argument in favour of services taxes but it is still possible and perhaps likely, that the provider of the service may be able to avoid the tax by falsifying returns. However, this is a problem faced by any tax. PART 5 CONCLUSION Current State services taxes have problems with equity but are not alone in this failing.[45] However, in terms of simplicity and efficiency they are on equal footing if not higher ground. However, overseas experience has displayed problems with broadly based services taxes as they rapidly become complex and often lead to inefficiency. This is particularly so where the tax is modified to rectify problems of equity. The lack of certainty surrounding efficiency and constitutional problems brings an element of risk into any proposal to introduce a services tax, despite some possible advantages in terms of simplicity. To avoid the constitutional problems, it has been suggested that section 90 of the constitution be amended to allow States to charge excises and hence legitimise a State goods and services tax.[46] However, referenda have a poor success rate in Australia.Despite problems with existing taxes, the uncertainty involved in the introduction of a State tax that is substantially different from its neighbours presents a real and difficult obstacle to the imposition of a broad-based services tax. However, its advantages may provide impetus for the States to promote collective reform. BIBLIOGRAPHY Cases Bambro (No. 2) [1964] NSWLR 183 Capital Duplicators (No. 1) (1992) 177 CLR 248 Capital Duplicators (No. 2) (1993) 118 ALR 1 Dennis Hotels Pty Ltd v Victoria (1960) 104 CLR 529 Gosford Meats Pty Ltd v New South Wales (1985) 155 CLR 368 Kenworthy Homes v Commissioner of Stamp Duties [1975] ATR 311 Philip Morris v Commissioner of Business Franchises (1989) 167 CLR 399 Western Australia v Chamberlain Industries Pty Ltd (1970) 121 CLR 1. Statutes Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Imp), 63 & 64 Vict. Stamp Act 1921 (WA). Texts and Monographs AUSTRALIAN RESEARCH FOUNDATION, Consumption Tax: Everyone s Guide to the Pros and Cons (Sydney: Australian Tax Research Foundation, 1989). BOLLARD, A. "New Zealand s Experience With Consumption Tax" 9(3) Australian Tax Reform (1992) 473. COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO THE AUSTRALIAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM, Australian Financial System Final Report (Canberra: Australian Government Printing Service, 1981). COMMONWEALTH TREASURY, Taxation and the Fiscal Imbalance Between Levels of Australian Government: Responsibility, Accountability and Efficiency (Report of the Working Party on Tax Powers, 4 October 1991). CROSSEN, S., "The Technical Superiority of VAT over RST", 4 Australian Tax Forum (1987) 419. GREENBAUM, ABE, "The Canadian Goods and Services Tax: A Sign of Things to come for Australia?" 20(2) Australian Business Law Review (1992) 186. HOCKLEY, J, "An Australian Goods and Services Tax" 1991 Australian Tax Review 217. LANE, P.H., A Manual of Australian Constitutional Law (Sydney: Law Book Company, 1991). McGIFFIN, B., "The Canadian Goods and Services Tax" (GST) CCH Journal of Australian Taxation (December 1991/January 1992) 53. McKENZIE, A., "Introduction to GST: A Practical Guide" (New Zealand: CCH, 1988). McLEOD, N. (ed.), 1993 Review of Western Australian State Taxes (Perth: Murdoch University School of Law, 1993). MATTHEWS, R., Distributional Equity, Tax Neutrality and Tax Effectiveness: Issues in Tax Reform (ACT: The Australian National University, 1985). TAIT, A.A., Value Added Tax: International Practice and Problems (Washington DC: International Monetary Fund, 1988. Notes: [1] Philip Morris v. Commissioner of Business Franchises (1989) 167 C.L.R. 399 at 427. [2] N. McLeod, ed., (Perth: Murdoch University School of Law, 1993). [3] 1993 Review of Western Australian State Taxes, N. McLeod, ed., (Perth: Murdoch University School of Law, 1993), 60 and 65. [4] Commonwealth Treasury, Taxation and the Fiscal Imbalance Between Levels of Australian Government: Responsibility, Accountability and Efficiency, Report of the Working Party on Tax Powers, 4 October 1991. [5] 1993 Review of Western Australian State Taxes, N. McLeod, ed., (Perth: Murdoch University School of Law, 1993), 95. [6] P.H. Lane, A Manual of Australian Constitutional Law (1991) (Sydney: Law Book Company, Sydney, 1991), pp. 352 - 353. [7] Capital Duplicators (No 2) (1993) 118 ALR 1 per Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane and McHugh JJ at 9. [8] Ibid, 14-15. [9] Capital Duplicators (No 2), Gosford Meat Pty Ltd v. New South Wales (1985) 155 CLR 368, Western Australian v. Chamberlain Industries Pty Ltd (1970) 121 CLR 1. [10] See Part 4: Simplicity. [11] See Chapter 10. [12] See Chapter 10. [13] A Liberal Theory footprint - see Chapter 10. [14] See Chapter 10, Liberal Theory. [15] Statistically. [16] See the discussion above. [17] See Part 1. [18] See Part 3. [19] Chapter 10. [20] As argued in: R. Mathews, Distributional Equity, Tax Neutrality and Tax Effectiveness: Issues in Tax Reform (ACT: The Australian National University, 1985). [21] Ibid. [22] Ibid. [23] 1993 Review of Western Australian State Taxes, N. McLeod, ed., (Perth: Murdoch University School of Law, 1993), 95. [24] R. Mathews, Some Reflections on the 1985 Tax Reforms (ACT: The Australian National University, 1985). [25] Commonwealth of Australia, Reform of the Australian Tax System: Draft White Paper (Canberra: Australian Government Printing Service, 1985). [26] S. Cnossen, The Technical Superiority of VAT over RST (1987), 4 Australian Tax Forum 419. [27] J. Hockley, An Australian Goods and Services Tax (1991), Australian Tax Review 217. [28] Bambro (No 2) v Comm of Stamp Duties [1964] NSWLR 183. [29] A. McKenzie, Introduction to GST: A Practical Guide (New Zealand: CCH, 1988). [30] Section 92 of the Australian Constitution and the Extra-Territorial powers of the States impact on the States ability to enact such provisions. Supra, note 6, pp. 371-386. [31] Alan A. Tait, Value Added Tax: International Practice and Problems (Washington DC: International Monetary Fund, 1988). [32] Ibid. [33] Ibid, at 56; See also Part 2. [34] Consider the reforms of the Whitlam Labour Government 1972-1975 on Education and the Hawke Labour Government on Medicare. [35] See Note 31. [36] Alan Bollard, New Zealand s Experience With Consumption Tax 9(3) Australian Tax Forum (1992) 473 at 479-80. [37] Canada - C$30 000 (Barbara McGiffin, The Canadian Goods and Services Tax (GST) CCH Journal of Australian Taxation (December 1991/January 1992) 53 at 58); New Zealand - NZ$24 000. [38] Abe Greenbaum, The Canadian Goods and Services Tax: A Sign of Things to Come for Australia? 20(2) Australian Business Law Review (April 1992) 186 at 191. [39] Supra, note 31, at 271. [40] Supra, note 31, at 273. [41] Supra, note 31, at 311. [42] Ibid. [43] Ibid. [44] See Bambro (No 2) [1964] NSWLR 183 for example. [45] See, generally 1993 Review of Western Australian State Taxes, N. McLeod, ed., (Perth: Murdoch University School of Law, 1993). [46] Committee of Inquiry into the Australian Financial System, Australian Financial System Final Report (Canberra: Australian Government Printing Service, 1981).